Pardon for Scooter Libby?

This blog features a series of regularly updated, brief essays regarding the possible presidential pardon of "Scooter" Libby with an emphasis on history, law and empirical research. The creator is ProfessorP.S. Ruckman, Jr., author of the forthcoming book, Pardon Me, Mr. President: Adventures in Crime, Politics and Mercy .

Monday, September 10, 2007

Libby's Law License

The Washington Post reports that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directed I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby Jr. - via a five-line per curiam opinion - to "show cause" as to why his license to practice law in that State should not be "placed on temporary suspension." The order was, of course, the by-product of Libby's federal convictions and it was posted on the Court's Worldwide Web page earlier this week (here). Libby has reportedly been licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania since 1976, but his license is in "inactive" status.

Records show Libby's current home address to be in McLean, Virgina, but his law license was temporarily suspended by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in April. He has been a member of that bar since 1978 and has even had his license suspended there before - in December of 2001 and October of 2006 for non-payment of dues (a $180 annual fee). In May, the Board on Professional Responsibility recommended that the D.C. Court of Appeals disbar Libby if his conviction is sustained on appeal.

Some may regard this landscape as familiar...

The Board of Professional Responsibility of the D.C. Bar recommended that former Assistant Secretary of State Eliot Abrams be suspended from law practice for one year because he gave false testimony to Congressional committees regarding what has become known as the Iran-Contra Affair. Abrams plead guilty but George H.W. Bush granted him a full and unconditional pardon.

Abrams then argued the pardon blotted out not only his convictions but also the underlying conduct, and that Bar Counsel's charges should be dismissed. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "although the presidential pardon set aside Abrams' convictions, as well as the consequences which the law attaches to those convictions, it could not and did not require the court to close its eyes to the fact that Abrams did what he did. "Whatever the theory of the law may be as to the effect of a pardon, it cannot work such moral changes as to warrant the assertion that a pardoned convict is just as reliable as one who has constantly maintained the character of a good citizen." As a result, the pardon could not "reinvest [Abrams] with those qualities which are absolutely essential for an attorney at law to possess or rehabilitate him in the trust and confidence of the court."